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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we derive testable implications of a unitary farm household model and a non-unitary, 
i.e. bargaining, model. In the unitary household model the impact of spouse specific resources and 
non-labor income on household decisions should not be different from that of the resources and 
non-labor income common to the household. In a bargaining model we expect to find a specific 
impact of spouse specific resources and non-labor income. Our empirical tests are based on a 
small survey of households in the Cordillera region of Northern Luzon (Philippines). In this region 
each spouse retains specific rights on her/his inherited land, although within marriage this land is 
treated as part of the household farm. Inherited land is a truly exogenous variable, which we use 
as the indicator of bargaining power. We perform probit regressions in which the spouses’ 
inherited land is a determinant of the probability that a husband or wife participates in the labor 
market. The statistical results provide some evidence of a specific impact of spouse specific land 
on labor market participation decisions and therefore cast doubt on the unitary farm household 




Decisions on demand for goods and services, labor supply, investment in human resources, etc. 
are taken within the household. The effects of policies on food supply, poverty alleviation, health 
and education are filtered through the household decision process. Understanding this process is 
therefore of crucial importance for the formulation of such policies.  
 
We distinguish between the unitary and collective models of household behavior. The unitary 
model of the household treats the household as a single decision maker. It assumes that the 
household’s preferences are adequately described by a single utility function. Many studies have 
questioned the validity of this approach and provided evidence for its rejection. The alternative 
collective model is based on the individual preferences of household members. It focuses on how 
the possibly conflicting preferences of individuals are combined to reach collective decisions. In 
collective household models it is natural to consider the household decisions as the outcome of a 
bargaining process between household members. Not only is this alternative approach more 
consistent with the assumptions of economic analysis on individual behavior, it may also be a 
more adequate reflection of reality. 
 
This paper presents the results of empirical tests of the unitary model’s implications for household 
decisions on labor market participation. The tests are base on data
1
 one of the authors collected 
in the Cordillera region of Northern Luzon (Philippines). In this region there has been an 
increasing integration of formerly subsistence villages into the regional and national economic 
systems. Mining, logging, temperate vegetable production and tourism have all contributed to the 
increased commercialization of Cordillera farm households' production activities. Markets for 
farm outputs and inputs and for manufactured goods have arisen. These developments have 
provided opportunities for couples to reallocate their available time between leisure and on- and 
off-family farm labor. (We will use the terms ‘household farm’ and ‘family farm’ as synonyms.) 
 
The farm households’ supply of off-family farm labor (or participation in the labor market) has 
been the subject of several studies (see Rosenzweig, 1980, Huffman, 1980, Huffman and Lange, 
1989, Kimhi, 1994, Jacoby, 1993, Skoufias, 1994). All these studies are based on the unitary 
                                                 
1
  In early 1994, one of the authors administered a questionnaire on intrahousehold relations to 
respondents from 126-landholding households in three villages in the Cordillera. In this region, the farm 
household’s primary access to land is by and large through inheritance and usufruct rights   4
farm household model. Several studies on labor supply of urban households have tested the 
hypothesis of income pooling. To our knowledge none as yet has attempted to test the 





Applying tests of income pooling to rural households is problematic because many rural 
households have little or no non-labor income receipts. Faced with this difficulty we followed a 
suggestion made by Schultz (1990) to concentrate on ownership of an underlying income 
generating asset. A successful implementation of a test of the pooling hypothesis requires that such 
an asset must be exogenous to the household’s decisions. The situation in the sample area 
provides a truly exogenous asset, i.e. spouse specific inherited land. 
 
In using inherited land as a measure of a spouse's bargaining power, we comply with the 
requirements suggested in the literature for a proper indicator of a threat point in a bargaining 
model. First, it should be exogenous to household decisions. Second, it should be a resource on 
which an individual spouse retains rights, i.e. brought into marriage by a spouse, but returned to 





In section 2, we discuss the labor allocation decision of a farm couple using respectively a unitary 
and a static Nash bargaining model of a farm household. We show why individual inherited land 
and non-labor income have separate effects on labor supply in a bargaining model. In section 3, 
we present the data of our household survey and a description of the variables used in the 
regressions of section 4, where we estimate a labor market participation function. Our purpose is 
to test whether a spouse's inherited land has an impact on each spouse's decision to participate in 
the labor market, i.e. to do off family farm work. If a spouse's inherited land is found to have an 
impact on a spouse's labor market participation, distinct from the household's total land, this 
finding can be interpreted as a rejection of the unitary household model. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
2
  A study which applies the insights of a bargaining model to rural households but focuses on 
consumption is Doss (1996b).  
3
  As Quisumbing (1992) points out, in rural economies where a significant proportion of wealth is 
inherited, and financial markets are imperfect, non-labor income may take the form of non-realized capital 
gains from inherited land.   5
2. OFF-FARM LABOR SUPPLY IN A UNITARY AND A COLLECTIVE FARM 
HOUSEHOLD MODEL 
We consider a farm-household consisting of a husband and wife who can choose 
to work on the family farm and/or off- farm.  We analyze this household's labor 
allocation decision using two household models : the traditional unitary household 
model and a collective model, in which decision making is characterized by Nash 
bargaining
4
.  The constraints in the two models are identical, but preferences 
differ. 
 
2.1. The objective functions 
The unitary household model is based on the assumption that there exist 
household preferences which are accepted by husband and wife. These are 
represented by a unique household utility function: 
 
(1)  U[C, Lh, Lw]  
 
where C stands for household consumption and L h and Lw for the husband’s and 




In the collective model each spouse has her own preferences represented by 
spouse specific utility functions : 
 
(2)  U
i[C, Li]  (i=h,w) 
 
each with the usual characteristics. Since our analysis will focus on labor 
allocation, we assume that C is a shared good within the household, a ‘public’ 
good available for husband and wife. Leisure is spouse specific and a spouse’s 
increased leisure does not directly affect the partner’s utility. 
 
                                                 
4
  See also the static Nash bargaining model with household production developed by Ott (1992: 46-67). 
5
   Decreasing marginal utility with respect to each of the arguments and marginal utility tending to infinity 
as consumption and each spouse’s leisure time tend to zero. As a result C and L i (i = h,w) will be 
positive.   6
Decisions are reached in the framework of a Nash bargaining process in which 
each spouse has a specific threat point D
i. The bargaining process can be 
modeled by an objective function, the Nash product, which can be used as the 
household’s objective function : 
 







A spouse’s threat point is the result of maximizing her individual utility function 
subject to her individual budget and time constraints (see section 2.3). 
Cooperation in the framework of the household should produce benefits. Each 
spouse's utility as a household member should not be less than her utility as an 
individual, so that in the bargaining model individual utility cannot fall below the 
threat point. When a spouse’s utility level obtained from cooperation in household 
activities would fall below this fallback position, she would withdraw her 
cooperation. The utility gains generated by household activities resulting from the 





2.2. The constraints 
The household faces three (pairs of) constraints on resources. These are the time 
constraints, the production function of the family farm and the household budget 
constraint. First there are individual time constraints for husband and wife  
 
(4)  Ti = Fi + Mi + Li    i = h, w 
 
where T i is a spouse’s time endowment, F i is time spent on work on the family 
farm, Mi is time spent on off-farm (market) work, and Li is leisure time. 
 
The second constraint is the farm production function. Farm output (Q) is 
produced from inputs of heterogeneous family labor consisting of that of the 
husband (Fh) and the wife (Fw), other variable inputs (X, which may be a vector) 
and a fixed amount of land (K). Variable inputs include purchased inputs like 
                                                 
6
  For simplicity, we assume that spouses have equal bargaining skills. This assumption is not relevant to 
our analysis.  It can be dropped without altering our conclusions.   7
seeds and fertilizer, and hired labor. Family labor and hired labor are not perfect 
substitutes in production. K is the household’s farmland that can consist of 
inherited land brought into the marriage by each spouse, non-inherited land jointly 
acquired by the couple or land on which a spouse may have usufruct rights. 
 
(5)  Q = G[Fh, Fw, X; K] 
 
The marginal contribution of each factor to output is assumed to be positive. 
 
Income from the farm (p) is called profit. It is equal to PqQ - PxX, where Pq is the 
price of farm output and Px represents (a vector of) the prices of farm inputs. 
 
The third constraint is the joint household budget constraint 
 
(6)  p + vhMh + vwMw + Ih + Iw  = PcC 
 
The left-hand side is the sum of farm income (p), the spouses’ off-farm earnings 
(viMi) and non-labor income (Ii).  This income must cover consumption 
expenditures, P cC, where P c is the price level of the purchased good. By 
distinguishing each spouse’s earnings from market work, vhMh and vwMw, we are 
able to account for differences in wage rates.  
 
The production constraint (5) can be combined with the income constraint (6) to 
obtain 
 
(6a)  (PqG [Fh , Fw ,X, K] - PxX ) + vhMh + vwMw + Ih + Iw  = PcC  
 
The model also includes non-negativity constraints on each spouse’s family farm 
work and market work. Remark that in contrast to household consumption and 
leisure time, work on the family farm and market work may be equal to zero. 
 
2.3. The threat point 
 
Before deriving the market labor supply decisions resulting from the two models, 
we first discuss the threat points, D
i (i = h,w), in the bargaining model. We have   8
previously defined D
i is the level of utility that a spouse would enjoy if she/he were 
to live by herself as a single-person household rather than with the partner. This 
implies that we assume that the best alternative to being married is to be single. 
Under this assumption, D
i is equal to the utility resulting from the maximization 
problem of a single-person household : 
 
(7)  D
i = max U
i[Ci, Li] 
 
subject to a spouse’s individual time and budget constraints as well as the non-
negativity constraints on individual on- and off-household farm labor. 
 
(8)  Fi + Mi + Li = Ti 
 
(9)  (PqG[Fi, X, Ki] – PxX) + viMi + Ii = PcCi 
 
and non-negativity constraints on Fi and Mi. 
 
The solution of this problem depends on the parameters of the model, i.e., prices, 
the wage rate, landholding and non-labor income. Therefore we can write 
 
  (10)  D
i = Di(Pq, Px, Pc, vi, Ki, Ii) 
 
The value of D
i represents a spouse's threat potential. Precisely for this reason it is 
also referred to as the conflict point.
7
. An analytical expression for the threat 
point in the case of a loglinear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas farm 
production function is derived in appendix. 
 
2.4. Off-family farm labor supply 
The decisions on consumption, farm production and time allocation that result 
from the two household models, are obtained as the solution of two maximization 
problems. In the unitary household model expression (1) is maximized subject to 
                                                 
7
  Exogenous changes in threat points result from changes in the environment, e.g. changes in prices, 
wages or transfers (see McElroy, 1990). Threat points can also change due to endogenous factors. The 
latter refer to changes that result from household decisions themselves such as savings or periods of 
‘unemployment’ voluntarily chosen in order to raise children (see Ott, 1992). We do not consider the 
latter.   9
the constraints (4) - (6) and the non-negativity constraints for on- and off-farm 
labor. In the collective model expression (3) is maximized, using (10) as the threat 
point, subject to the same constraints. 
 
In this text we are particularly interested in the spouses’ decisions on participation 
in the labor market. We therefore define the off-family farm or market labor 
supply in both models. In the unitary household model, each spouse's off-family 
farm labor supply can be written as 
 
  (11)  Mi = f(Pc, Pq, Px, vi, vj, K, Ii + Ij)  (i = h,w, i „ j) 
 
Market labor supply thus depends on total available land and on the sum of the 
spouses’ non-labor income.  
 
In the collective or bargaining model the market labor supply can be written as  
 
  (12)  Mi =  f(Pc, Pq, Px, vi, vj, K, Ii + Ij, D
i, D
j)  (i = h,w, i „ j) 
 
which, using (10) can be reformulated as 
 
  (13)  Mi =  f(Pc, Pq, vi, vj, K, Ki, Kj, Ii + Ij, , Ii, Ij)  (i = h,w, i „ j) 
 
Thus in the bargaining model inherited land enters the labor supply in two ways, 
once as a component of the land available to the household and second as a 
resource to which a spouse has individual rights, in the sense that in case of a 
marriage break-up it would go to this spouse. Similarly a spouse's non-labor 
income enters as a component of a couple's non-labor income, but also as a 
separate determinant. 
 
The absence of D
h and D
w from or their presence in the labor supply function 
provides an opportunity to discriminate between the two models of household 
behavior we specified in subsection 1. According to the unitary model of 
household behavior spouse-specific land and non-labor income enter in the 
market labor supply function only as components of the household's available land 
and non-labor income. In a bargaining model they also enter separately, as 
determinants of each spouse's threat point. 
   10
In our empirical research we concentrate on landed property; we do not explicitly 
consider non-labor income. To discriminate between the two models we need 
information on resources that a spouse brings into the marriage but can take along 
when the marriage dissolves. Local custom in the Cordillera region of Northern 
Luzon provides an ideal example of such a resource. In this region the individual 
spouse continues to own the land she or he inherited. In the case of marriage 
dissolution she/he takes it along (Prill-Brett, 1987; Wiber, 1986). Therefore, 
inherited land is an obvious candidate as an indicator of a spouse’s threat point. 
The validity of the unitary household model can thus be tested by analyzing 
whether an individual spouse’s inherited land is a determinant of off-household 
farm labor supply. If this turns out to be the case, the collective model would 
appear to offer a more adequate description of household behavior than the 
unitary model. 
 
3. THE DATA FOR THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The data for our empirical analysis were collected in the framework of a household survey. A 
sample of 126 landholding households was drawn from three villages, in the highlands of Northern 
Luzon in the Philippines. The villages were Paoay (Benguet province), Cudog (Ifugao province) 
and Sagada (Mountain province). Farming is a major source of livelihood in these rural areas. 
Commercial vegetable production is a primary occupation in Paoay and an alternative farming 
activity in Sagada and Cudog. In the latter villages rice is the primary crop. It is often grown 
mainly for home consumption, but households sell part of their rice harvest. 
 
After dropping observations with missing values, a sample of 225 married individuals with 112 
couples and one husband (for whose wife the information was missing) was used for estimating 
our regression equations. Of the 112 couples 48 couples lived in Paoay, 24 in Cudog, and 40 in 
Sagada. 
 
3.1. Off-farm work 
In this paper we try to explain  a spouse's participation in the labor market. Participation is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a person does off-family farm work and 0 otherwise. Participation 
rather than labor supply was used because we had no adequate data on the latter.  
   11
With households adopting commercial vegetable farming, hiring labor for farm work has increased 
markedly. Because of this and other opportunities for work generated by rural commercialization, 
wage earnings have become an important alternative source of income. The number of persons 
with work outside the family farm in the sample is shown in Table 1. In our sample there are 
relatively more husbands (64%) than wives (45%) who work outside the family  farm.  
 
Table 1: Persons in the sample working outside the family farm 
 
  Spouses    Husbands    Wives   
  n  %  n  %  n  % 
             
Total  123  55  72  64  51  45 
             
Paoay  40  42  23  48  17  35 
Cudog  29  60  18  75  11  46 
Sagada  54  68  31  78  23  58 
 
The percentage of persons doing off-family farm work varies among the villages. The percentage 
is lowest in Paoay and highest in Sagada both for husbands and wives. This can be explained by 
the larger farm sizes in Paoay and the presence of more opportunities for off-farm work such as 
tourism related activities in Sagada.  
 
The distribution of households in the sample by the on and off-family farm work status is 
presented in table 2. 
   12

























In 27% of households in the sample both spouses work only on their farm; in 36% of households 
both spouses work both on and off the family farm. While there are 28% of households where the 
husband does off-farm work while the wife does not, there are only 10% of households where 
the wife does off-family farm work and the husband doesn't. 
 
3.2. Inherited land 
An important form of access to cultivated land among farm households is through inheritance. In 
the mountain provinces of Northern Luzon inheritance rules for land do not discriminate between 
males and females. Both daughters and sons can inherit land. In case of a ‘divorce’ (in the sense 
of the customary way of dissolving a marriage) often due to childlessness, a spouse retains 
property rights on her or his inherited land. Property passes from parent to child, but it does not 
cross clan lines. If a spouse dies childless, her or his inherited land returns to her/his clan. 
Although there is a clear customary recognition of each spouse’s control over her/his inherited 
land within marriage, plots are cultivated jointly as a family farm. There are no plots specifically 
for wives or for husbands (see Prill-Brett, 1987; Wiber, 1986). 
 
As shown in section 2.3 in a bargaining model the amount of inherited land is one of the variables 
determining a spouse’s threat point, i.e. her or his fallback position. Using inherited land as a 
determinant of a spouse's threat point and hence including it in the off-family farm labor 
participation function has the great advantage that it is a truly exogenous variable. It does not 
result from household decisions on savings and asset accumulation, nor is it affected by labor 
allocation decisions. 
   13
Table 3 shows the number of households where husbands and/or wives own inherited land. In 
almost half of the couples in the sample both husband and wife own inherited land, while there are 
only 15 couples where neither husband nor wife does so. 
 
Table 3: Households with inherited land 
 
  Husband has inherited 
land 
    no  yes  total 
         
Wife has   no  15  28  43 
         
inherited land  yes  18  52  70 
         
  total  33  80  113 
 
In all three villages the mean of inherited land conditional upon owning such land is higher for 
husbands than for wives. The differences between the unconditional means of husbands’ and 
wives’ inherited land are larger than the conditional means shown in table 4, because there are 
more women than men without inherited land. For non-irrigated land the difference between 
husbands' and wives' inherited land is more pronounced than for irrigated land. Therefore we will 
include separately each spouse’s inherited irrigated and non-irrigated land holdings in our 
regressions.   14
Table 4: Mean and  Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Variables Used in Probit 
Equations 
 
  Spouses  Husbands  Wives 
  n = 225  n = 113  n = 112 
       
Participants in work outside the family farm  n = 123  n = 72  n = 51 
       
Land variables       
Couple’s inherited land (in hectares)       
      Irrigated  0.25  (0.52)     
      non-irrigated  0.34  (0.74)     
       
Personal inherited land, conditional upon 
holding such land (in hectares) 
     irrigated 
     non-irrigated 
 
0.13  (0.35) 
0.17  (0.54) 
 
0.15  (0.39) 
0.21  (0.65) 
 
0.10  (0.27) 
0.12  (0.38) 
       
Land asymmetry (in favor of the husband) 
      irrigated 
      non-irrigated 
    
0.07  (0.60) 
0.05  (0.69) 
 
 
       
Personal characteristics       
  age   43.2   (11.9)  44.6   (12.1) 
 
41.7  (11.6) 
  finished high school    n = 36  n = 25 
  finished college    n = 10  n = 18 
       
Household composition       
  number of children aged less than 6 years  0.94  (1.11)     
  number of children aged 6 to 11 years old  1.04  (1.13)     
  number of children aged 12 to 18 years old  1.09  (1.24)     
       
Village effect (Reference village = Cudog)       
Dummy variable for village Paoay  n = 96  n = 48  n = 48 
Dummy variable for village Sagada  n = 80  n = 40  n = 40 
       
 
In the regressions we will represent the individual spouses’ inherited land by a land asymmetry 
variable. The reason for doing so is that what matters is not simply the bargaining strength of each 
spouse per se but rather one spouse's strength relative to the other's. This is also suggested by the 
analysis of the special case of a loglinear utility function and a Cobb-Douglas farm production 
function (Crisologo-Mendoza, 1997). We introduced asymmetry variables separately for irrigated 
and for non-irrigated inherited land.   15
 
In the univariate probit regressions of section 4 based on pooled data of married individuals, the 
asymmetry variable for inherited land is defined as (Ki - Kj)/(Ki + Kj) where Ki is own and Kj is 
the spouse’s inherited land. In the separate univariate probit regressions for husbands and wives 
and in the bivariate probit regressions, the variable measuring the asymmetry in inherited land is 
defined as the husband’s minus the wife’s inherited land divided by the sum of the husband’s and 
the wife’s inherited land, i.e. (Kh - Kw)/(Kh + Kw). The asymmetry variable is thus measured ‘in 
favor’ of the husband. In this case the coefficient of the variable may therefore be expected to 
have opposite signs for husbands and for wives. For the 15 couples where both husband and wife 
did not have inherited land, the asymmetry variable was set equal to zero. 
 
Remark that a spouse’s inherited land also enters the regression as a component of the 
household’s total available land. We define this as the sum of the husband's and the wife's 
inherited land. Non-inherited land is not included as it is not independent of the decision to work 
on or off the family farm (see also Huffman and Lange, 1989). Means of access to non-inherited 
land include fixed rental, sharecropping or purchase. 
 
3. Other explanatory variables 
In expressions (11) and (13) apart from land (and non-labor income on which we have no data) 
off-family farm labor supply is also determined by the prices of consumption goods and farm 
inputs and by market wages. As prices are identical for all persons in a village we do not include 
them in our labor market participation regressions. Village dummies may capture price differences 
across villages. 
 
We do include as explanatory variables personal characteristics like sex, age and education. 
Personal characteristics like sex, age and schooling determine an individual’s productivity and can 
therefore be considered as determinants of the spouses' actual or potential wage. We also include 
three indicators of household composition, i.e. the number of children in three age groups. These 
may determine a spouse's willingness to participate in off-family farm work. marginal value of 
his/her time when none of it is allocated to off-farm work. Data on age, schooling and household 
composition are given in table 4. 
 
In addition to land, personal characteristics and household composition variables, we also include 
as explanatory variables in our regressions village dummies. This is done to catch village effects.   16
The dummy variables stand for differences in the local labor markets as well as for differences in 
the farming systems, land and crop types
8
. Cudog was used as reference village. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section, we present tests on whether a spouse’s inherited land affects the decision to 
participate in work outside the family farm in the Cordillera region of the Philippines. The primary 
intent is to establish whether the relative bargaining power of husband and wife matter when a 
household takes decisions on labor market participation. 
 
We proceed in the following manner. First, we estimate a univariate probit model explaining the 
probability of participation in work outside the family farm for a married individual. We assume 
that data on the individuals in our sample are independent observations and we use a dummy 
variable for gender. Second we estimate a univariate probit model separately for husbands and 
wives. Finally we use a bivariate probit model to estimate the decisions on labor market 
participation of husband and wife. This model takes into account the interdependency of these 
decisions, i.e. the fact that these decisions are made jointly by husband and wife. Also, it is likely 
that the error terms in the off-farm participation functions of husbands and wives are correlated 
because of unobserved characteristics (see Kimhi, 1994).  
 
In each regression we test whether a spouse’s inherited land has an impact on labor market 
participation decisions that is distinct from the total land available to the household. The 
hypothesis that only the total land available to a couple and not the individual components on 
which one of the spouses has specific rights, matter for household decisions, is a characteristic of 
the unitary model. Unlike the unitary model, the collective model asserts that spouse-specific 
resources have an impact on household decisions distinct from that of pooled household 
resources. As stated in section 3.2, in our models spouse-specific control of resources is 
represented by variables measuring asymmetry in ownership of inherited land, irrigated and non-
irrigated. These variables are meant to capture the bargaining power of a spouse relative to that of 
her or his partner. 
4.1. Univariate probit model for married individuals 
 
                                                 
8
  Other studies include farm characteristics such as type of crop grown or value of farm assets, or acres of 
farmland operated as explanatory variables (see Huffman, 1980, Kimhi, 1994).  This we do not do.  
Differences in the type of crop are captured by the dummy variables for the villages.   17
We first present results based on data for all individuals in the sample, considered as independent 
observations. The variables included in the regression and the estimation results are presented in 
Table 5. 
 
The probit model correctly predicts 70 per cent of the total number of cases, 60 per cent of those 
who do not participate in the labor market and 79 percent of those who do. 
 
The coefficient of the sum of the couple’s inherited irrigated land has a negative sign and is 
significantly different from zero. This can be interpreted as follows : having more irrigated land 
raises the productivity of time allocated to farm work which reduces the probability of off-farm 
work. The same cannot be said of non-irrigated land: the coefficient of the sum of non-irrigated 
land is positive, but it is not significantly different from zero.  
 
The coefficients of the asymmetry variables for inherited irrigated and non-irrigated land are not 
significantly different from zero. The estimation of the univariate probit model does not offer 
support for the assertion that spouse-specific resources matter for decisions on labor market 
participation. This implies that there is no indication of bargaining between spouses when such 
decisions are taken. Thus the hypothesis that the unitary household behavior model is valid, is not 
rejected. 
   18
Table 5: Probit estimates of off-farm work status of married individuals 
 
Dependent variable: probability that a spouse works 
off-family farm 
coefficient  
(standard error in 
parenthesis) 
intercept  2.46 
(2.30) 
   
(log of) sum of inherited irrigated land   -0.05** 
(0.02) 
(log of) sum of inherited non-irrigated land   0.01 
(0.02) 
   
asymmetry in inherited irrigated land in one’s favor  -0.16 
(0.15) 




   
(log of) own age  0.98 
(0.89) 
(log of) spouse’s age  -1.54* 
(0.91) 
   
dummy for completed high school education  0.08 
(0.30) 
dummy for spouse’s completed high school education  -0.64** 
(0.31) 
   
dummy for completed college education  0.80** 
(0.41) 
dummy for spouse’s completed college education  -1.45*** 
(0.42) 
   
dummy for gender (wife = 1)  -0.48** 
(0.22) 
   
number of children aged less than 6 years  -0.07 
(0.13) 
number of children aged 6 to 11 years   0.24*** 
(0.09) 
number of children aged 12 to 18 years   0.10 
(0.08) 
   
dummy for Paoay village  -0.35 
(0.25) 
dummy for Sagada village  0.54** 
(0.27) 
c
2  (df = 16)  52.81 
 
*, **, *** denote coefficient significantly different from 0 at respectively 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 probability 
levels. 
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Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
 
Actual  Predicted  0  1  Total 
0  61  41  102 
1  26  97  123 
Total  87  138  225 
 
We briefly comment on the other estimation results. The coefficient of own age is positive, but 
statistically not different from zero. The coefficient of the spouse's age is negative and statistically 
different from zero at the 10 percent level. This suggests that the older one’s partner is, the less 
likely it is that a person will do off-family farm work. Three of the four education variables are 
significantly different from zero. Their signs suggest that a higher level of education raises the 
probability that a person participates in the labor market, whereas a higher level of a spouse’s 
education reduces this probability. The gender dummy variable is negative and significantly 
different from zero at the five per cent level., suggesting that wives are less likely than husbands to 
do off-family farm work. The coefficient for the number of young children is negative but not 
significantly different from zero. The coefficients for the two groups of older children are positive; 
for the number of children aged 6 to 11 years it is significantly different from zero at the one per 
cent level. These results are an indication that the presence of older children may substitute for 
adult work on the farm or in the home. Finally the probability of participating in the labor market 
is significantly higher for people living in Sagada than for those living in Cudog. Compared to 




4.2. Separate univariate probit estimates for husbands and wives 
 
In the univariate probit regression of the previous section, the dummy variable for gender had a 
coefficient significantly different from zero. This result suggests that the participation in the labor 
market is determined in a different way for husbands and wives. Therefore it seems appropriate 
to estimate a labor market participation function separately for husbands and wives. This we do in 
this section. One implication of this procedure of course is to reduce the degrees of freedom by 
fifty per cent. Table 6 presents the coefficient estimates for the univariate probit model for 
husbands and wives separately.   20
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2 (df = 15)  35.39  20.69     21
*, **,  *** denote coefficient significantly different from 0 at respectively 0.90, 0.95 and 0.99 levels of 
probability. 
 
Frequencies of actual and predicted outcomes 
 
  Husbands  Wives 
Actual  Predicted  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 



























The chi-square statistic for the husbands’ probit regression is significant at the one per cent level 
while for the wives’ probit regression it is not significant at the ten per cent level. The model 
correctly predicts 75 per cent of the cases for the husbands and 70 per cent for the wives. 
 
In both regressions the coefficient of the sum of inherited irrigated and non-irrigated land is not 
significantly different from zero at the ten per cent level. In the regression for husbands the 
coefficient of the asymmetry variable for irrigated land is negative and significantly different from 
zero, meaning that the more inherited land a husband holds compared to his wife, the less likely he 
is to do off-family farm work In the regression for wives this coefficient is positive, but not 
significantly different from zero. The coefficients of asymmetry of inherited non-irrigated land 
holding are also not significantly different from zero, this time in both regressions. These results 
thus offer mixed evidence as to the hypothesis implicit in the unitary model that individual inherited 
land holding does not matter in decisions on labor market participation. 
 
As for the other variables, the coefficients of own education are positive while those of the 
spouse's education are all negative. Moreover four of the eight coefficients are significantly 
different from zero. This is evidence that a person's own education has a positive impact on 
her/his labor market participation whereas her/his spouse's education reduces her/his probability 
of being involved in off-family farm work. In the equation for husbands the coefficients of the 
number of children in the two older age groups are positive and significantly different from zero at 
the five per cent level. For wives these coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The 
presence of older children seems to enhance the probability of off-family farm work by the 
husband. But the data provide no evidence of an impact of the number of children on labor   22
participation by wives. Finally the village dummies have the same sign as in table 5, but are not 
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. 
 
 
4.3. Bivariate probit model for farm couples 
 
In this section we use a bivariate probit model to check for the eventual impact of individual 
spouse’s inherited land on labor market participation. We use a bivariate model to take into 
account that labor market participation decisions of husband and wife in a household are unlikely 
to be independent. Therefore the corresponding disturbances  eh and  ew are likely to be 
correlated. Assuming that eh and ew have a standard joint normal distribution, the appropriate 
statistical model is the bivariate probit model (see Huffman and Lange, 1989; Guyomard and 
Benjamin, 1992; Kimhi, 1994). The estimation results for this model are presented in table 7. 
 
As table 7 shows, the correlation between eh and ew is confirmed by our results. The model 
"predicts" correctly decisions on labor market participation by 80% of the couples in the sample. 
But very few coefficients in this regression are significantly different from zero at conventional 
levels of probability. In fact this is the case only for two education variables and for one 
household composition variables. More particularly none of the individual land variables turns out 
to be statistically different from zero at the 90% confidence level.  
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Table 7: Bivariate probit estimates of off-farm work status 
 
  HUSBAND  WIFE 














     








     










     








     








     








     












     




dummy for Sagada village  0.51 
(0.57) 
0.50 
(0.41)   24
     
correlation coefficient  for eh and ew  0.56** 
(0.25) 
 
*, **, *** denote coefficient significantly different from 0 at respectively 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99 levels of 
probability. 
Actual and predicted (in parenthesis) outcomes 
  Husbands 
Wives  0  1  Total 



















Let us now focus on the coefficients of the asymmetry variables. The coefficients of the 
asymmetry variables (defined as asymmetry in the husband's favor) for inherited irrigated land 
have signs similar to those in tables 5 and 6; the signs suggest that the probability of a person's 
participation in the labor market decreases as she/he holds more inherited irrigated land relative to 
her/his spouse. But for neither husbands nor wives these coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at conventional levels. The coefficients of the asymmetry variables for inherited non-
irrigated land are both negative, but they have relatively high standard errors implying that they are 
not at all significantly different from zero.  
 
Can we conclude that the unitary model of the household cannot be rejected by our analysis? 
Indeed, none of the coefficients of the asymmetry variables for inherited land is singly significantly 
different from zero. However since the spouses’ labor market participation decisions are not 
independent, we need to test whether the asymmetry variables for husband and spouse are jointly 
not significantly different from zero. To do this we test whether the regression results incorporating 
the restriction that the asymmetry in inherited land holding are zero are not statistically different 
from those of a regression in which the value of the asymmetry variables coefficients is 
unrestricted. 
 
If the hypothesis that asymmetry in inherited land holding has no effect on a spouse's labor market 
participation, then the maximum value of the log-likehood function incorporating the restriction, 
lnLR, should not be significantly lower than lnLUR, the maximum value of the log-likelihood 
function when this restriction is not imposed. The log-likelihood ratio test is whether 2(lnLUR -   25
lnLR) is significantly different from zero (see Kennedy, 1979). This statistic follows a chi-square 
distribution.  
 
For inherited irrigated land, we obtain a value of the statistic of 5.89, compared to a critical value 
of 4.61 (n=2) at the 10% level of significance. We conclude that the two coefficients are jointly 
different from zero. For inherited non-irrigated land a similar test does not permit us to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the asymmetry variables are equal to zero. The analysis thus 




In this article we have devised a test for analyzing whether within rural households in the 
Cordillera region of northern Luzon (Philippines) decisions on spouses’ participation in labor 
markets are made by husband and wife acting as one decision maker (the unitary household 
model) or rather result from a bargaining process (the bargaining model). The test is based on the 
importance of inherited land in household decisions and on the fact that each spouse retains his 
rights on such land in case of a marriage break-up. Such land also does not cross clan lines. 
Inherited land is a truly exogenous variable that can be used as an indicator of a spouse’s 
bargaining power. 
 
 The unitary model implies that the sum of spouse-specific inherited land is what matters in 
household decisions. We therefore we tested the unitary model’s implicit restriction that individual 
inherited land has no separate impact on labor market participation decisions.   
 
The results of all our regressions, except the regression for labor market participation of  wives 
only, provide some evidence of the impact of inherited irrigated land on labor market participation 
decisions and in favor of rejecting the unitary model’s claim.  However not all evidence points in 
this direction. The main exception is non-irrigated inherited land for which no distinct effect on 
labor market participation was found. However this was also the case for the sum of non-irrigated 
land. As a result it seems that non-irrigated land, whatever its status, is not a determinant of labor 
market participation decisions. But control of spouse-specific resources in the form of inherited 
irrigated land may matter for household allocation decisions. To the extent that this is true, our 
data offer evidence rejecting the unitary household model. 
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Appendix. Derivation of the Threat Point. 
 
We consider a one person household with loglinear preferences over consumption and leisure and 
a Cobb-Douglas production function for the family farm. Farm production depends on family 
labor and on land and is characterised by constant returns to scale. For simplicity other inputs are 
omitted. Household labor can be employed on the family farm or offered in the market. In the 
latter case employment opportunities are available at a fixed wage. Non-labor inputs are omitted; 
their inclusion makes the problem not analytically treatable. 
 
Under these assumptions, the decision problem of a single person household may be written as 
follows 
 
max bclnC + bllnL 
 
subject to  PqF
aK
1-a + vM = PcC      (1) 
 
L + F + M £ T       (2) 
 
M = 0          (3) 
 
All variables refer to the single decision maker. Land K is exogenously determined. T stands for 
the total time. The decision variables are 
  C = consumption; 
L = leisure; 
F = on farm labor; 
M = market labor. 
 
The decision maker has no impact on prices, i.e. the prices of farm output Pq, and of consumer 
goods, Pc, and the wage rate, v. 
 
The constraints refer to the budget, the time constraint and the non-negativity of off-family-farm 
labor. The associated dual variables are written as l, g, and f. Remark that consumption C, 
leisure L and farm labor F will be non-negative due to the form of the objective function and of 
the farm production function. 
 
The first order conditions for a maximum are 
   6
  bc/C - lPc = 0         (4) 
 




1-a - g = 0        (6) 
 
  lv - g + f = 0          (7) 
 
and the constraints (1) to (3). Remark that due to the specification of the objective function and 
the production function for the family farm, constraints (1) and (2) will hold with equality in the 
optimum. The complementary slackness condition associated with constraint (3) is fM = 0. 
 
If in the optimum M = 0, we can drop (3) and (7). We first analyse this case and then consider a 
solution with M>0.  
 
Case 1 : M = 0 
In this case constraint (2) implies that L = T  – F. By using this expression for L, combining 
expressions (5) and (6) and substituting for l from (4) we obtain 
 




Substituting for PCC from the budget constraint (1) we obtain  
 
  bl/(T-F) = abc/F 
 
This gives us the following expressions for farm labor F : 
 
  F = [abc/(abc+bl)]T        (8) 
 
As leisure L = T –L, we can write leisure as : 
 
  L = [bl/(abc+bl)]T        (9) 
 
Finally we derive consumption C from the budget constraint (1) and family farm labor F as 
defined in (8) :   7
 
  C = (Pq/Pc)[abc/(abc+bl)]
aT
aK
1-a    (10) 
 
Substituting expressions (9) and (10) in the objective function, we obtain the following expression 
for the utility maximising value of the objective function, i.e. the threat point : 
 
D = bcln(Pq/Pc) + (abc+bl)lnT + (1-a)bclnK + z  (11) 
 
where z is a function of the parameters of the model : 
 
  z = abcln[abc/(abc+bl)] + blln[bl/(abc+bl)] 
 
Expression (11) shows that D is an increasing function of land K. 
 
Case 2 : M>0 




1-a = v 
 
which results immediately in an expression for F : 
 
  F = (aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K        (12) 
 
Next we derive M. First we derive two analytical expressions for g. Substituting in expression (7) 
for l from (4), using the budget constraint (1), and substituting for F from (12), we obtain : 
 
  g = bcv/[Pq(aPq/v)
a/(1-a)K + vM]    (13) 
 
From (5), using time constraint (2) and substituting for F from (12), we derive a second 
expression for g : 
 
  g = bl/L = bl/[T - (aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K – M]   (14) 
 
From the right hand sides of equations (13) and (14) we derive, after some manipulations, an 
analytical expression for M :    8
 
  M = bc/(bc+bl)T - (1/a)Z(aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K  (15) 
 
where Z = (abc + bl)/(bc + bl). 
 
By substituting (12) and (15) in time constraint (2) we derive the following expression for leisure : 
 




Finally we derive an analytical expression for consumption C by substituting (12) and (15) in the 
budget constraint : 
 
  PcC = Pq(aPq/v)
a/(1-a)K + v[bc/(bc+bl)]T - (v/a)Z(aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K 
 
Dividing by PC which we get an expression for consumption : 
 
  C = (v/Pc) [bc/(bc+bl)][T + ((1-a)/a)(aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K]    (17) 
 
Substituting expressions (16) and (17) in the objective function, we obtain the following 
expression for the utility maximizing value of the objective function, i.e. the threat point : 
 
  D = bcln(v/Pc) + (bc+bl)ln[T + ((1-a)/a)(aPq/v)
1/(1-a)K] + z’  (18) 
 
where z’ = bcln[bc/(bc+bl)]. + blln[bl/(bc+bl)]. 
 
From (18) it is immediately clear that the threat point is an increasing function of land K. 
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